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The paper focuses on satisfaction with income and proposes a utility model built on 
two  value  systems,  the  `Ego'  system  -  described  as  one  own  income  assessment 
relatively to one own past and future income - and the `Alter' system - described as 
one own income assessment relatively to a reference group. We show how the union 
of these two value systems and the use of relative deprivation measures can lead to a 
model able to accommodate a wide range of theories on income and happiness. The 
model is then tested using the Consortium of Household Panels for European Socio- 
economic Research (CHER), a collection of 19 panel surveys including over 1.2 m. 
individual observations. We find absolute income to sit at the intersection between the 
`Ego'  and  the  `Alter'  systems  and  to  play  the  most  prominent  role  in  explaining 
satisfaction  with  income.  Relative  deprivation  is  also  found  to  be  important  for 
understanding the income-happiness nexus while we find income expectations to be 
less relevant once we control for absolute income. Overall, the `Alter' system (the 
cross-section comparison with others) seems to be more relevant in valuing income 
than the `Ego' system (the longitudinal self-comparison of income). 
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In economics, utility is a measure of satisfaction and individuals are expected to
maximize satisfaction by choosing the right consumption bundle under budget
constraints and decreasing marginal returns. In such framework, an increase in
income should lift the budget constraint and lead to increased utility.
Much of the happiness literature appeared over the past three decades has at-
tempted instead to explain the `Easterlin paradox'. Easterlin (1974) observed that
average life satisfaction in the United States during the post-war period did not
increase despite signicant gains in GDP per capita, a nding that challenged the
core economic axioms. Scholars across the social sciences have sought an explana-
tion to the `Easterlin paradox' and today there is a certain consensus on a number
of stylized facts. First, income is important for happiness but has decreasing
marginal returns both for countries and individuals. The fact that rich countries
or individuals show a very weak or no relation between income and happiness
is consistent with the fact that poorer countries and individuals show a positive
association. Second, absolute income is only part of the story. Relative income,
intended as income relative to the income of a reference group, is also important
and progressively more important than absolute income as countries or individu-
als become richer. Rich countries and people are expected to be more sensitive to
changes in relative income than to changes in absolute income. Third, aspirations
and expectations about the future play an important role in determining present
happiness and these expectations are formed in complex ways that may include
past income, income of a reference group, income inequality, income growth and
other factors.
This paper returns to the income-happiness relation consolidating into one
1framework old and new theories. We propose a model of happiness structured in
two main value systems: the `Ego' system described as the evaluation of one own
income across time and the `Alter' system described as the evaluation of one own
income relatively to the income of others. We show how this distinction and the
construction of a combined model can expand our understanding of happiness and
how such model can accommodate the founding principles of many of the most
prominent theories on income and happiness. We will focus on satisfaction with
income rather than life satisfaction and use recent advances in the measurement
of relative deprivation to structure a theoretical and an empirical model of income
utility. In particular, we will draw on theories of relative deprivation and income
inequality. The happiness literature has looked in detail at the question of relative
income while has paid less attention to the questions of relative deprivation and
income inequality. We will review some of the literature in these two areas and
try to derive lessons for our model.
The model is then tested on a panel of rich countries where the Easterlin
paradox is expected to be most evident. We use for this purpose one of the
largest available collection of panel data, the Consortium of Household Panels for
European Socio-economic Research (CHER), an harmonized data set that joins 19
panel surveys including over 1.2 m. individual observations. Such data allow us
to focus on a very restricted sample of individuals in prime working age and with
regular working hours and use a continuous measure of individual income.
We nd absolute income to sit at the intersection between the `Ego' and the
`Alter' systems and to play the most prominent role in explaining satisfaction with
income. Relative deprivation is also found to be very important for understand-
ing the income-happiness nexus while we nd income expectations to be of little
2relevance once we control for absolute income. Overall, the `Alter' system (the
cross-section comparison with others) seems to be more relevant in valuing income
than the `Ego' system (the comparison with oneself over time). These ndings are
robust to linearity tests and multiple specications of the happiness equation, two
issues that normally complicate the study of the relation between relative income
and happiness.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss the role of relative
deprivation and income inequality in theories of well-being. Section 3 outlines the
theoretical model and section four describes the data and empirical specication.
Section 5 presents results and section 6 concludes.
2 Relative deprivation and income inequality in
theories of well-being
The idea that the evaluation of goods and people is not only related to absolute
status but also to relative status is very old and can be traced in writings of
ancient Greek philosophers, middle-ages theologists and seventeen and eighteen
century social scientists. Adam Smith and Karl Marx shared this same view.
In the Wealth of Nations Smith discusses at length the importance of a relative
gain as compared to an absolute gain in at least two chapters, the chapter on
colonies and trade (Chapter 9) and the chapter on rent of the land (Chapter 11).
And Marx has been quoted to argue that \Our desires and pleasures spring from
society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve
for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative
3nature."1 Some of the most prominent theories of the twentieth century consider
explicitly the idea that relative status is essential to understand individual utility.
This section discusses those theories that considered more in detail the question
of relative deprivation and income inequality.
The three volumes of the `The American Soldier' by Stouer et al. (1949) are
credited for introducing the concept of relative deprivation. The term is used to
refer to the feeling of deprivation experienced by soldiers when comparing their
status with the status of other soldiers in the same corps, in dierent corps or with
civilians across dierent dimensions. The work clearly pointed to the importance
of the reference group in making assessments about one own status and opened
the way to a stream of contributions on relative deprivation in various sciences
including sociology, political science, psychology and economics.
A rst formalization of a model of relative deprivation can be found in Davis
(1959). The author denes relative deprivation as the feeling accruing to a deprived
person when status is compared with the status of a non-deprived. He distinguishes
between within group comparisons and between group comparisons, reiterating the
importance of the reference group. According to Davis, within group comparisons
afect the sense of `fairness' experienced by individuals and can generate feelings of
relative deprivation or relative gratication. Between group comparisons aect the
sense of `social distance' experienced by people leading to sentiments of `relative
subordination' or `relative superiority'. We nd here not only a formalization
of the concept of reference group but also a distinction in the feelings that may
emerge from within group and between group comparisons.
A second attempt to use formally the construct of relative deprivation can
be found in Leibenstein (1962) theory of democracy. The author distinguished
1Quoted in Davies (1962)
4between three types of social comparisons: 1) `Pure Pareto comparisons' in which
each individual takes into account his own income and no one elses; (2) `the share
of the pie' comparisons in which each individual takes into account the income
distribution from a relative point of view but not the absolute magnitude of his
income; and 3) the `compromise Pareto comparison' in which individuals take into
account both the absolute magnitude of their income and their relative income
position. Leibenstein provides a rst attempt to combine the role of absolute
and relative income in a utility model (the `compromise Pareto comparison') and
shows how, by combining these two perspectives, one can reach rather dierent
conclusions for public policies from those suggested by the Pareto principles.
Perhaps the most popular theory of relative deprivation is found in Runciman
(1966) theory of social justice. Runciman denes the situation of relative depriva-
tion when an individual: 1) Does not have X; 2) Sees some other person or persons
as having X; 3) Wants X and 4) Sees it as feasible to have X. The rst point
denes deprivation as a lack of X while the second introduces the concept of refer-
ence group, two aspects that we have already encountered with previous authors.
The third and fourth conditions relate instead to wills and expectations. It is not
sucient to be materially deprived, it is also necessary to aim at a better status.
Runciman brings to the fore the importance of the selection of the reference group
and the role of expectations in shaping feelings providing in this way a value func-
tion of material well-being. \For the purpose of addressing relative deprivation,
however, peoples estimates of their incomes are if anything more important than
their actual income" (p. 189).
The concept of relative deprivation has also been widely used in theories of
revolutions and social unrest. Gurr (1968) built a model of civil strife around the
5notion that relative deprivation is the basic precondition for civil strife. Relative
deprivation is dened as \(...)peoples perception of the discrepancy between value
expectations (goods and material conditions that individuals think they are entitled
to) and their values capabilities (the amounts of goods and conditions that indi-
viduals think they can get and keep)." (p. 1104). Here the emphasis is on the
gap between possessions and expectations irrespective of the amount of posses-
sions and of the legitimacy of expectations. While Runciman opens the chapter
on expectations and relative deprivation, Gurr oers an alternative explanation on
how expectations lead to deprivation by focussing on the gap between actual and
expected entitlements.
The role of expectations is also important in theories that emphasized income
mobility rather than income relativity. Over a century ago Karapeto (1903)
wrote: \The degree of life-satisfaction of separate individuals or of whole societies
is measured, not by the absolute quantity of goods possessed, but by the rapidity
with which this quantity is increasing." (p. 681). Karapeto represented this
concept with what he called the `progress curve', a growth curve with an initial
slow path of growth followed by rapid growth and maturity. He argued that
happiness is maximized when the progress curve reaches its maximum steep rather
than its maximum level. \The individual at this period is sanguine and full of
hope: every day brings something new to his life; he is conscious of the fruit of
his labor." A similar idea is found in Davies (1962) theory of revolutions. For
Davies, revolutions are most likely to occur during recessions that follow periods
of growth rather than during periods of persistent poverty. And people are the
happiest during periods of sustained growth rather than during periods of high
but stable wealth, a phenomenon that the author illustrates graphically with a J-
6shaped curve. Both Karapeto and Davies emphasize the role of change in raising
or crushing expecations. In these theories, it is change that shapes deprivation and
the notion of `relative' refers to one own past or expected future situation rather
than to the comparison of one own status with that of a reference group.
Income mobility and the role of expectations are also central to Hirschman
and Rothschild (1973) tunnel eect theory.2 \The tunnel eect operates because
advances of others supply information about a more benign external environment;
receipt of this information produces gratication; and this gratication overcomes,
or at least suspends, envy." (p. 546) \In this eventuality, the increase in income
inequality would not only be politically tolerable; it would also be outright desir-
able from the point of view of social welfare." (p. 548). The tunnel eect theory
provides a rst insight into the relation between deprivation and inequality and
predicts that income inequality may increase rather than reduce feelings of satis-
faction, at least in the short-term. In the long-term, the persistence of immobility
in the face of mobility of other members of society can turn into an explosive so-
cial device. Envy can quickly replace gratication and reverse the tunnel eect.
This is strikingly similar to Davies (1962) J-curve hypothesis although, as noted
by Hirschman, in the J-curve hypothesis a downturn is a necessary condition for
upheaval whereas in the tunnel eect hypothesis a downturn is not necessary for
reversing the tunnel eect. It is sucient that the people who observe mobility
and who are not moving remain stuck in such condition for a suciently long pe-
riod of time. The tunnel eect theory provides in this way dierent predictions on
how a rise in income inequality turns into feelings of deprivation in the short and
2The seminal paper is usually quoted as Hirschman (1973) but the article contained a math-
ematical appendix written by Rothschild that claries and expands the tunnel eect concept to
the long-term case, when the tunnel eect is reversed. This important addition to the theory is
often neglected when the tunnel eect theory is quoted but is an essential part to understand
the short-term nature of the tunnel eect.
7long-term.
An alternative formalization of the relation between relative deprivation and
income inequality can be found in Yitzhaki (1979). Yitzhaki proposed to measure
the concept of individual relative deprivation described by Runciman (1966) by
summing up the distances between one own income and all other incomes larger
than one own's. The sum of these individual scores across the population can then
be interpreted as a relative deprivation measure for a society. Yitzhaki showed
that the relative deprivation index constructed in this way is in fact equal to the
absolute Gini index (the Gini multiplied by the mean), a nding that generated
a stream of contributions exploring further the properties and use of such index
(Hey and Lambert (1980); Berrebi and Silber (1985); Chakravarty et al. (1995)).
In this tradition, the reference group is composed of richer people by construc-
tion, deprivation is understood in terms of material deprivation and `relative' is
intended as income dierences between one own income and the group of richer
people. As compared to previous contributions, this literature paid less attention
to the notion of feelings of deprivation (equating feelings of deprivation to mate-
rial deprivation)3 and to the notion of selection of the reference group (equating
richer people to the reference group).4 In a sense, while the pre-Yitzhaki literature
3Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) argued that (...) \the predominant meaning of the term
relative deprivation refers to the feelings expressed by a person or group of persons who are
falling behind others or who see others catching up with them in regard to income, inuence, and
status." (p. 546) and the psychologist Crosby (1979) specied that: \First, the term \relative
deprivation" is used to refer to the emotion of deprivation, an emotion generally conceived of as
one type of anger roughly synonymous with a feeling of resentment or dissatisfaction or with a
sense of grievance".
4It should be noted that in a further paper Yitzhaki (1982) discusses the question of reference
groups which is obviously not alien to the author. Here we focus on the relative deprivation
measure that became most popular in economics following the seminal 1979 article. A further
confusion originates from the use of the terms `absolute' and `relative' in statistical measurements.
In his seminal book on income inequality Gini (1912), spoke of the relative mean dierence
of incomes as the absolute mean dierence divided by mean income and dened his measure
of income inequality as equal to half of the relative mean dierence. The Yitzhaki relative
8focussed on feelings of deprivation and reference groups but did not provide an
empirical tool to measure relative deprivation dened in these terms, the post-
Yitzhaki literature provided a tool to measure relative deprivation but lost some
of the core elements that dened relative deprivation in the rst place.
An attempt to generalize the Yitzhaki approach while introducing a mecha-
nism for the selection of the reference group is provided by Panning (1983). The
author builds a model of income inequality and relative deprivation exploiting ear-
lier postulates by Festinger (1954) and Nagel (1974) whereby a) The more unequal
the assets of two individuals, the less happy the poorer will feel if he compares
himself with the richer and 2) The tendency of two individuals to compare their
own wealth with that of the other varies inversely with the dierence in their
wealth. Here we nd the same idea found in Yitzhaki that relative deprivation
increases with inequality and that feelings of deprivation arise from income in-
equality but also the additional insight that the value given to income dierences
is inversely proportional to such distance. This last proposition can be regarded
as a mechanism to select the reference group.
More recently, Clark and Oswald (1996) have looked into the possibility of
selecting the reference group according to individual characteristics on the as-
sumption that individuals compare themselves rst and foremost with their likes.
In such framework, incomes predicted on the basis of individual characteristics
provide a simple mechanism for the selection of the reference group and predicted
incomes become an alternative tool to study satisfaction. Other contributions have
looked more in detail at how to include such selection mechanism of the reference
group into measures of relative deprivation constructed on income (Verme and
deprivation index is equal instead to the absolute Gini index (half of the absolute mean dierence)
which complicates further the interpretation of the term `relative'.
9Izem (2008) and Silber and Verme (2009)) or on labor indicators (Verme (2009)).
In these measures, the selection of the reference group is reected in predicted in-
comes and the predicted income distribution is considered jointly with the income
distribution combining in this way the notions of income, reference group, income
rank and income inequality into one measure.
Happiness research has also greatly emphasized the role of the reference group
and relative income in explaining life satisfaction. Clark et al. (2008) provide a very
comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical contributions to the explanation
of the Easterlin paradox based on absolute and relative income measures. They
recognize the importance of social comparisons and adaptation when considering
income in a happiness function and the existence of internal and external reference
points for income comparisons, the rst described as past incomes and the second
described as income of a reference group. Put it simply, most of the happiness




where: i=individual; t= present time; Y = income; Y =Relative income (where
relative income can be interpreted as one own past income or average income of
the reference group).
In the equation above, the internal and external reference points are captured
by the second term on the right-hand side where one own income is put in relation
with one own income in the past or the income of a reference group. These
types of models are popular in happiness research and they have been able to
explain rather well the Easterlin paradox, contributing to dene those stylized
facts on income and happiness that we have outlined at the outset of this paper.
10Yet, this literature has not considered in great detail relative deprivation intended
as perceived deprivation, rarely discusses the mechanism for the selection of the
reference group, does not attribute great importance to income inequality and
does not approach the question of the relation between relative deprivation and
inequality. These are aspects that the relative deprivation and income inequality
literature reviewed in this section have addressed. In the next section, we propose
a model that builds on this recent happiness literature and includes some of the
critical issues emerged from the discussion on relative deprivation and income
inequality theories.
3 Model
We can think of the value system of an individual as composed of two sub-value
systems which we will call the `Ego' system and the `Alter' system.5 We will refer
to the `Ego' system when individuals evaluate their own income by comparing
it with their own income in the past or with their future expected income. The
`Ego' system is longitudinal in nature and panel data are necessary to evaluate
such system. We will refer to the `Alter' system when individuals evaluate their
own income relatively to the income of others and we will refer to `others' as the
reference group. We will consider this system cross-section as it is standard in the
happiness literature, although it is potentially possible to consider incomes of the
reference group in the past or in the future.6
Visually, the two value systems model that we propose can be depicted as in
5This terminology was also used by Davis (1959).
6We will not consider this last option as there is no particular economic reason to introduce
the temporal notion of reference group (there is no reason to argue that people compare their
own income today relatively to an income distribution in the past) while such addition would
greatly complicate the model.
11Figure 1: A Value Model of Happiness and Income
Figure 1. In the Figure, the `Ego' system is shown horizontally, from the past
to the future as we move from left to right. The `Alter' system is instead shown
vertically. On the top side we nd richer people and on the bottom side we nd
poorer people. The two systems cross at the income of person i at time t, the
individual at the present time.
The two value systems contribute to shape the individual utility function. In
its most simplistic form, an income utility function that describes the model should






where: Ui;t = Individual utility at the present time; Yi;T = Individual income
12through time with T = (t   1;t;t + 1)7; Y 
t = Income of a reference group at
the present time; ue(:) = Evaluation function of the `Ego' system and ua(:) =
Evaluation function of the `Alter' system.
Before we introduce the model more in more detail, a few clarications are
necessary. First, we will not make a distinction between utility and happiness.
This is a point that is not often discussed in the happiness literature and that
deserves attention. However, the practice in the happiness literature has been to
use the two terms as synonymous (Easterlin (2001) and Alesina et al. (2004)) and
this is what we do in this paper.
Second, most studies on happiness and income consider happiness either with
direct questions on happiness or with questions on life satisfaction. In this pa-
per, we focus instead on the notion of satisfaction with income. Life satisfaction
is evidently the product of a multitude of factors and income satisfaction can
be considered as a sub-component of life satisfaction together with satisfaction
with family and friends, satisfaction with housing and others. Presumably, vari-
ables such as income, relative income and income inequality aect life satisfaction
through satisfaction with income. By focussing on income satisfaction, we expect
to reduce noise in understanding how income aects life satisfaction.
Third, unlike most happiness studies, we consider both individual income mea-
sured from household surveys and GDP per capita. Cross-country studies often
consider GDP per capita as a measure of income while panel studies on individual
countries rely on household income data. These two traditions emerged because
cross-country studies such as the World Values Surveys or the US Social Survey
do not contain information on individual income8 whereas, in longitudinal studies
7For simplicity, we model the past as t   1 and the future as t + 1.
8Except for variables such as income scales where respondents are asked to what income group
they belong to.
13on single countries such as the British or German panels, GDP per capita cannot
be used as explanatory variable in an happiness equation. Although we should
expect GDP per capita and average household income to follow a similar pattern
over time, these are structurally dierent measures and can follow very dierent
paths, especially in the short-term.9 It is therefore possible that cross-country
and longitudinal studies reach dierent conclusions because of the use of dierent
measures of income. The Easterlin paradox was constructed on GDP data while
several contributions in the empirical literature have focussed on household income
in an eort to explain the Easterlin paradox. In this paper, we will employ both
variables.
3.1 The `Ego' system
This section models more in detail the rst component of the utility function
proposed. We explained that the `Ego' system refers to the evaluation of one own




i;t = U(Yi;t 1;Yi;t;Yi;t+1) (3)
where UE is income utility in the `Ego' value system, i refers to individuals,
t refers to present time and t   1 and t + 1 refer respectively to past and future
incomes.
Empirically speaking, the measurement of present income requires cross-section
data on income which are commonly available in surveys on income and wealth
9During the early years of the new millennium, Kazakhstan was growing at an average of
9% per year in terms of GDP per capita while household income was growing at only 0.7% on
average (Verme (2010)).
14worldwide. The measurement of past incomes requires instead panel data where
the same individual can be followed over time. These surveys are more dicult to
nd and only a few tens of countries dispose of such instrument, which makes the
cross-country study of income dynamics dicult. However, this is a problem that
we can overcome by using the CHER data set described further in the paper.
More problematic is the empirical specication of future expected income. If
surveys contain questions on expected future income this is a simple and eective
solution to the problem. People are asked about their expected future income and
this variable is included into the empirical model. If, instead, this information
is missing we need to construct some theoretical model on how people construct
expectations about future incomes. In this case, expected future income is a latent
variable and some assumptions are necessary to construct a proxy for such variable.
Here we can seek help from the theoretical review provided earlier in the paper and
argue that people use information about their own income mobility, the mobility of
others in the reference group and the more general development with the economic
situation in the country. This is information that individuals are most likely to
have and that we should expect contributing to future income expectations. We
should therefore expect future income to be a function of one own income growth,
income growth of the reference group and growth of GDP per capita as follows:10
EYi;t = E(Yi;t+1) = f(Yi;t;Y

t ;GDP=capt) (4)
where  refers to the growth rate and t refers to the post-growth period. These
10Note that E(Yi;t+1) represents both the perceived and statistical notions of expected income.
It is what people think their future income will be and the expected value of a distribution of
possible expected incomes centered on the mean. We put EYt = E(Yi;t+1) to underline that
expectations about future income are formed at the present time and contribute to present
utility.
15are the `dynamic' ingredients of the income utility function as suggested by the
literature we have reviewed. However, the literature is rather vague in indicating
how the value function f(:) is shaped. To address this issue, we simply assume that
expected income is equal to present income inated by the average growth rate
of income, reference income and GDP per capita so that expected future income
amounts to a simple formula as follows:
EYi;t = Yi;t(1 + (((Yi;t + Y

t + GDP=capt)=3)) (5)
The formula implicitly assumes that the three measures are weighted equally.
Other assumptions that attribute dierent weights to the dierent components
may also be used. For example, we may argue that individual income growth
should weigh more for future expectations than other people's income growth.
However, the relative deprivation literature reviewed has pointed to the impor-
tance of relative income in shaping expectations while much of the literature on
income mobility and on happiness has highlighted the role of GDP growth. More-
over, we should expect the weight attributed to the dierent components to vary
considerably across individuals. Thus, the average growth across the three com-
ponents can be regarded as a reasonable assumption.
We may also assume that past income contributes to present satisfaction with
income only through expected future income. There is no particular reason to
assume that last year's income contributes to this year's satisfaction with income
unless savings are involved. On the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that
past and present incomes contribute to shape future expectations and that these
expectations may change the way we feel about present income. Considering also
that income growth is constructed with past and present income [Yi;t = (Yt  
16Yt 1)=Yt 1], the `Ego' income utility function can be reduced to
U
E
i;t = U(Yi;t;EYi;t) (6)
3.2 The `Alter' system
We dened the `Alter' system as the evaluation of one own income relative to
the income of others in a reference group. Therefore, the sub-utility function
of the `Alter' system should include individual income, the income of reference
individuals and the cardinal and ordinal sequences of all incomes, i.e. distances
between incomes and income rank. A utility function that captures these elements






where t is the present time, Y 
t is the income of the reference group and r is
an indicator of rank.
The key issue to dene in the `Alter' system is the reference group. How do
people select the reference group? Our hypothesis is that individuals compare
themselves with their likes, people with similar individual characteristics such as
age an education as already described for Clark and Oswald (1996) and Verme
and Izem (2008). Here we borrow from a more recent paper by Silber and Verme
(2009) that proposes a measure of relative deprivation including the notions of
reference group, absolute income, relative income and income rank into one index.
The index contains all the ingredients of the `Alter' utility function proposed and
has the advantage of structuring the relation between these ingredients into a
formula. One of the problems experienced by the empirical literature on happiness
17and income is that variables such as absolute income, relative income and income
inequality are highly correlated and regression coecients and signicance levels
can be aected by such collinearity. Reducing these variables into a structured




where: [:::1=n:::]0 is the row vector of population weights; G= is the `G' matrix
as dened in Silber (1994) (a square matrix with all `0' along the diagonal, all `1'
above the diagonal and all `-1' below the diagonal); [:::si:::] is the column vector of
shares of income sorted in descending order of incomes and [:::wi:::] is the column
vector of shares of predicted incomes sorted in descending order of incomes.
The rst component on the right-hand side of the equation is the Gini coecient
of incomes (GY). The second component (GW) is a scalar calculated with matrix
calculus in the same fashion as the Gini of incomes but based on predicted income
shares sorted in order of incomes. Predicted incomes are estimated with a linear
equation where the explanatory variables are variables thought to be used by the
population to select the reference group.
Econometrically, predicted incomes are closer for people who have similar char-
acteristics. In other words, more weight is given to the likes of people, a principle
that complies to the notion of reference group we have adopted. Economically,
predicted incomes can be interpreted as the income expected by individuals given
their own characteristics as compared to the characteristics of others in the refer-
ence population. In this way, both the notions of selection of the reference group
and creation of expectations based on this selection are captured.
In substance, the relative deprivation index proposed captures incomes, pre-
18dicted incomes, rank in incomes, the reference group and income inequality, all the
notions we wish to have in the `Alter' model. Note that the RD relative depriva-
tion measure, unlike the Gini coecient, can be estimated and is meaningful at the
individual level. This is interpreted as the individual score of relative deprivation
(RDI), adds up to relative deprivation for a society and it is decomposable by
population sub-groups.11 The adoption of the RDI index reduces the specication
of utility in the `Alter' system to
U
A
i;t = U(RDIi;t) (9)
and completes the composition of the aggregated income utility of the `Ego'
and `Alter' systems as follows:
Ui;t = U(Yi;t;EYi;t;RDIi;t;Zi;t) (10)
where Ui;t is satisfaction with income and Zi;t is a vector of variables controlling
for other non-income factors aecting satisfaction with income.
4 Data and empirical specication
The database we use is the Consortium of Household Panels for European Socio-
economic Research (CHER).12 This is a collection of panel survey data whose
variables have been harmonized into a consistent data set. It includes 19 panel
11The proposed index is also decomposable into two components representing structural mo-
bility (change in income) and exchange mobility (change in rank). For more details see Silber
and Verme (2009).
12The consortium was established in 2000 and is coordinated by CEPS/INSTEAD in Luxem-
bourg who also holds the rights for the use of the data. The paper was written by the author
during a visiting period at CEPS/INTEAD nanced by the European Commission's IRISS pro-
gram. For more information on the CHER project see Schmaus et al. (2003).
19studies carried out between 1990 and 2001 and totaling over 1.2 millions individ-
ual observations, which makes it the richest data archive of its kind. The data set
contains a wealth of variables including among others income, individual charac-
teristics and satisfaction with income. It is therefore a unique resource to combine
individual variables such as individual income with group variables such as GDP
per capita and income inequality and reconsider the income-happiness relation
within the extended model proposed.
The sample we consider includes individuals in age 30-50 with a declared work-
ing time of at least 15 hours per week and with positive incomes. This excludes
most individuals in precarious working conditions and in the process of entering
or exiting the labor market. We opted to look at individuals with stable working
conditions so as to reduce the impact on satisfaction with income of non income
factors related to work such as youth contracts or pre-retirement arrangements.
Data are pulled into a single cross-country equation with country and year
xed eects. The dependent variable is satisfaction with income and is measured
on a ve steps ladder where `1' stands for \Not at all satised" and `5' stands for
\Completely satised". Estimations are made with an ordered logit model and
robust standard errors. The theoretical description of the model provides enough
structure for the empirical specication. The model requires current income (Y ),
expected income (EY ) and relative deprivation (RDI) as well as a vector of control
variables as follows:
Si;t =  + 1(ln(Yi;t)) + 2(ln(EYi;t)) + 3(ln(RDIi;t))
+1(Xi;t) + 2(Cc) + 3(Tt) + i;t
(11)
where S is satisfaction with income, X is a vector of control variables for
individual characteristics, C is a vector of country dummies, T is a vector of
20years dummies and  is the error term (c and t stand for countries and years
respectively).  stands for the coecients of our variables of interest and  stands
for the coecients of the control variables. This is therefore a static cross-section
model where the dynamic growth considerations are structured into the equation
through expected income.
As a measure of income we use annual individual income net of taxes. Annual
income was preferred to shorter measures to avoid problems of seasonal income uc-
tuations while net income was preferred to gross income as individuals presumably
care about take-home pay rather than pre-tax income. Given the cross-country
nature of the equation, this variable has been transformed in constant terms with
base 2000, in dollar equivalent and in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). For the
transformation in real terms we used the CPI index published by the IMF for each
year and each country.13 For the US dollar equivalent PPP transformation we use
a conversion factor prepared by the CHER consortium.14 In equation [11], the
income variable has been further transformed in natural logarithm but alternative
transformations will also be considered.
Expected income (EY ) was calculated inating current income by the aver-
age growth rate of individual income, reference income and GDP per capita as
indicated in the previous section. GDP per capita was also used in dollar equiva-
lent and purchasing power parity as provided by the IMF for each year and each
country. By construction, expected income is correlated with income which may
or may not create problems for the estimations. This is an issue that is further
discussed in the results section.
Relative deprivation (RDI) was calculated at the individual level following the
13See http://www.imf.org/external/data.
14This variable was kindly provided by Gunther Schmaus at CEPS/INSTEAD, Luxembourg.
21Silber-Verme formulation as described in the model section. By construction, rel-
ative deprivation for individuals (RDI) sums up to relative deprivation for the
population (RD). Recall that RDI uses incomes and predicted incomes. The vari-
ables included into the equation for predicting income are gender (a dummy for
females), age (in years and in squared form), education levels (primary, secondary
and tertiary education), a dummy for the self-employed as opposed to the employ-
ees and a dummy for state sector employment. These are the variables we thought
relevant for the selection of the reference group. Note that RDI was further scaled
up to allow for various non linear transformations of the variable.
As individual controls in the happiness equation (X) we use gender (a dummy
for females), age (in years and in squared form), education levels (primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary education), marital status (dummy for formally married peo-
ple), household size (in units), a dummy for the self-employed versus the employees
and a dummy for state sector employment.
5 Results
Modeling empirically the equation proposed presents some relevant challenges,
some of which have been addressed in the construction of the model. A pooled
cross-country equation over multiple years is aected by country heterogeneity
and time eects, two issues that were addressed by inserting country and xed
eects. The study of satisfaction with income restricts the sample to working
individuals but working histories and status vary greatly across workers. To reduce
this problem, we restricted the sample to people in age between 30 and 50 years old,
eliminating in this way most of those people who are in the process of entering
or exiting the labour market. We also restricted the sample to those with at
22least 15 hours of work per week so as to limit the noise that would accrue from
individuals with very irregular or scarce working hours. The estimation of expected
income also required the use of growth rates for income, reference income and GDP
per capita. The use of these variables to construct expected income reduces the
usable sample to panel observations. Working cross-country with several currencies
implied that we had to transform all incomes into constant values, per dollar
equivalent and in purchasing power parity. We also make use of several variables
to control for various individual characteristics and this further reduced sample
size for the regressions. The factors above combined reduced our usable sample
to about 193,000 observations. These are some of the reasons that explain why it
is so dicult to model the relation between income and happiness including most
factors suggested by the literature and justies the use of the CHER database for
such purpose.
Non-linearity and multicollinearity are two additional issues to consider. As
suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature on income and happiness,
the relation between these variables may be non-linear. To address this issue
we opted to transform the three variables of interest (income, expected income
and relative deprivation) into logarithmic, exponential and categorical form and
compare regression coecients across these dierent types of transformations. This
is important not only to uncover non linear traits but also to explore covariance
within quantiles.
Multicollinearity is a further issue often neglected by the happiness literature.
This literature has made great use of a range of income related variables including
income, relative or reference income constructed in various ways, lagged income,
income inequality, income deprivation and others. All these variables are built
23starting from the same indicator of income and are correlated with income by
construction. Statistical packages drop automatically variables if there is perfect
collinearity among regressors but not if collinearity is below perfect.
Multicollinearity does not aect the overall prediction of the model but aects
coecients of individual predictors and generally increases standard errors making
predictions more dicult to detect. The solutions to the problem are to drop one of
the variables, group variables into one indicator and/or use a very large sample to
increase the probability of signicance. The rst two solutions defeat the purpose
of these types of models which seek to explain satisfaction with variables such
as income and relative income in conjunction, while the third solution is hard
to adopt when one works with only one country. In this paper, some of the
explanatory factors described have been grouped into the expected income and
relative deprivation variables and we also dispose of the largest data set available
for this type of studies. In addition, we will test all possible specications of the
equation with the three variables of interest.
Tables 1 and 2 present the results. Table 1 includes equations for the linearity
tests and table 2 includes equations for the collinearity tests. Predictors for indi-
vidual characteristics are shown only in Table 2 while the results for country and
year xed eects are omitted from both tables for the sake of clarity.15 The tables
report odds ratios and z-statistics.
Note that Table 1 reports results for the same four equations (column head-
ings 1, 2, 3 and 4) by variable of interest (income, expected income and relative
deprivation). Equation 1 uses the three variables in simple form, equation 2 in
logarithmic form, equation 3 in simple, squared and cubic form and equation 4 in
quantile form. In all four equations of Table 1, the three variables of interest are
15These results are available form the author on request.
24used together whereas Table 2 considers alternative combinations of variables in
turn.
Absolute income shows a consistent positive and signicant sign in all equations
in Table 1 (columns 1-4) and 2 (columns 1, 2 and 4).16 The odds of belonging to
the highest income satisfaction level are higher if income is higher and the odds
ratios for the variable in logarithmic form are rather high, between 0.5 and 1. The
relation is also clearly linear in income satisfaction. Whether the variable is used
in simple, logarithmic, squared, cubic or categorical form, the coecient is always
positive and signicant. It is also noticeable that when the variable is split into
classes the odds ratios increase in a rather linear way moving from the lowest to
the upper class. This variable is also not aected by model specication. Whether
we include or exclude expected income or relative deprivation the coecient is
consistently positive and signicant.
We shall conclude that absolute income invariably increases satisfaction with
income. This result was expected and complies with most theoretical and empirical
contributions. It is also not necessarily in contrast with the `Easterlin paradox'.
The paradox was originally based on the relation between average satisfaction
with life and GDP per capita over time in the US. Here we consider instead in-
dividual satisfaction with income and individual income cross-country. Much of
the literature on the `Easterlin paradox' has used GDP per capita or individual
income depending on data availability without really making a normative distinc-
tion between the two measures. We argue instead that these are two very dierent
variables and cannot be used as substitutes to study the `Easterlin paradox'. In
our model, GDP per capita is important but enters the individual utility function
16Note that in Table 1, coecients for the three variables of interest are reported next to each
other but they belong to the same four equations.
25through expected income.
Expected income is a more volatile variable and the interpretation of the results
leads to some important caveats. The variable is highly correlated with income
(Pearson correlation coecient = +0.96). When the variable is used in conjunction
with income, it shows a negative sign (Table 1, column 1 and 2 and Table 2,
column 1) whereas it shows a positive sign when used without income (Table
2, columns 3 and 5). The variable would be positively correlated with income
satisfaction but once income is taken into account the residual eect is negative.
This eect is not uncommon with highly collinear variables. For example, two
variables x and y positively correlated with a third variable z and with the same
mean and variance but dierent Kurtosis and Skewness can show opposite signs
when regressed against z. This is what we observe with expected income and is a
phenomenon that may well apply to other income measures such as relative income
or income inequality. It is important therefore to rely on an economic framework
that justies the use of the variables separately or in conjunction. In our model,
income and expected income are part of the same value system and should be used
in conjunction.
Expected income also shows a non-linear relation with income satisfaction (Ta-
ble 1, columns 3 and 4). When expected income is squared or cubic, the sign turns
positive and is still (weakly) signicant (Table 1, column 3). Instead, when the
variable is categorized, the relation with income satisfaction is positive and sig-
nicant for the second decile and non signicant for the other deciles (Table 1,
column 4). These last two results are not in contrast. What we observe is that the
slope of the relation with income satisfaction is rst negative and signicant for
very low levels of expected incomes and then turns positive and weakly signicant
26for higher levels whereas within the smaller decile samples the signicance of the
relation is lost.
Non linearity of expected income can be better appreciated looking at Figure
2. In Figure 2 we plotted income satisfaction (conditional on the control variables)
and expected income by quantiles of expected income (conditional on income, rel-
ative deprivation and control variables). The rst and last deciles show a negative
relation whereas the central quantiles show positive or at relations. This is con-
sistent with results in Table 1, column 4 where the base category is the rst decile.
Here we see that the relation turns positive and signicant for the second decile
and non signicant for upper deciles.
In substance, the relation between income satisfaction and expected income
conditional on income is complex to detect, non linear and also weak, with rather
low odds ratios. Of course, this may be explained by the particular construction
of the expected income variable that we proposed but such construction is not
economically unsound and any other alternative measure of expected income would
be structurally correlated with income and likely to exhibit similar problems.
Relative deprivation shows instead a rather consistent negative relation with
income satisfaction. In both tables 1 and 2, the signs are always negative and
signicant with the exception of the squared and cubic values of the variable that
are non signicant (Table 1, column 3). For this variable, the within deciles coe-
cients are all negative and signicant and the odds ratio increase in value linearly
(with one exception) as we move from low levels of relative deprivation to higher
levels. Relative deprivation has always a negative eect on satisfaction with in-
come irrespective of the decile considered. The variable is correlated with both
income and expected income (Pearson correlation coecients of about +0.6 for
27both variables) and removing the other two variables increases signicantly the
odds ratios (Table 2, columns 2, 3 and 6). These results are consistent with the
theoretical and empirical literature that point to relative deprivation as an impor-
tant factor in explaining satisfaction and reinforce the ndings that the position
of individuals within a reference group is important in explaining satisfaction.
Signs and signicance of individual characteristics are largely as expected and
consistent with previous literature (Table 2). Females have greater income sat-
isfaction than males. This result is signicant and negative only in column 6 of
Table 2 where absolute and expected incomes are omitted. Thus, income being
equal, women are more satised with income.17 Age has the expected negative
sign for young age while it turns positive for older ages. This is true whether abso-
lute and/or expected incomes are included into the equation. Education increases
the odds of high income satisfaction as expected. Secondary and tertiary edu-
cation progressively increase the odds of having higher satisfaction as compared
to primary education. Marriage also increases satisfaction with income whereas
the number of children decreases it. Both these ndings are well known in the
happiness literature. To be self-employed signicantly increases the odds of being
happier with income as compared to the to the status of employee while state and
private sector workers do not show any signicant dierence.
17Note that is not in contrast with the recurrent nding of wage discrimination against women






































































































30Figure 2: Income Satisfaction and Income Expectation
6 Conclusion
The paper has proposed a model of income satisfaction composed of two value
systems, the `Ego' system described as the comparison of one own income over
time and the `Alter' system described as the comparison of one own income with
the income of others. We constructed aggregated measures for the two systems
that would accommodate a wide range of theories on the income-happiness relation
drawing mainly on the concepts of relative deprivation and income inequality.
Such procedure has also the advantage of reducing the number of regressors in the
empirical strategy and overcome in part issues of collinearity.
We nd absolute income to sit at the cross-section between the `Ego' and `Alter'
systems, both theoretically and empirically. This variable emerges as the most
important predictor of income satisfaction and contributes to both value systems.
Once we control for absolute income, the relation between income satisfaction and
31expected income becomes complex to assess, non linear and overall rather weak.
We also nd relative deprivation to play a very important role reducing signif-
icantly satisfaction with income. In line with relative income theories, this points
to the importance of considering the relative position of individuals in addition to
the absolute position. Overall, these ndings suggest that the `Alter' value system
(the comparison with others) dominates the `Ego' value system (the comparison
with oneself) in explaining satisfaction with income.
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